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Abstract 
The presence of de-facto independent entities infringe on Georgia's traditional perception of its 
territorial integrity and importantly, inhibit the consolidation of its democracy.  Imperative to an 
understanding of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 'frozen conflicts' necessitates an 
understanding of regional histories, domestic politics, international involvement, territorial 
claims and the composition of ethnic identities.  Further, examination of the reasons why the 
Autonomous Republic of Ajaria did not transition to a separatist region, as did Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, provides a useful analytical marker from which one can discern the complexities 
of Georgia's situation.  Using Barbara Walter's work regarding reputation building as a 
framework for examination of the political dimension of separatist conflicts as well as Monica 
Toft's work on the territorial aspect of conflict provides the theoretical anchor for this research.  
It is a result of differences on all analytical fronts that the current political status of Ajaria as an 
Autonomous Republic within the Republic of Georgia is ultimately subject and accountable to 
the Georgian government.  Likewise, the de-facto independent condition of both Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia results from disparity regarding its history, geographic location, territorial 
resources and domestic politics.  Currently, Georgia aims to join the security paradigm 
constructed by NATO and the United States, as well as reaping the benefits of eventual 
membership in the European Union.  In response to a Georgian trajectory now oriented toward 
Europe, Russia is resolved to serve as the guarantor of Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
independence as well as their further integration into Russia's political sphere via the signing of 
substantive bi-lateral agreements.  Thus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are at the epicenter of the 
fight for regional hegemony and the balance of power in South Caucasus. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CHALLENGES TO GEORGIAN STATENESS 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many newly independent states struggled with 
democratic transition.  Aside from tumultuous economic problems, some post-Soviet states were 
also home to multiple ethnic minorities who laid claim to the same territory as the newly 
sovereign state.  This was and is the case between Azerbaijan and Armenia regarding Nagorno-
Karabakh.  This stateness problem also pertains to Georgia regarding its separatist regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Stateness, defined by Stepan and Linz, is essentially the 
incongruence of "...the territorial boundaries of the political community's state and profound 
differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state..."1  As a sovereign state in 1918 to 
1921 and after 1991, Georgia had challenges to its stateness.     
This paper seeks to explore endogenous and external forces influencing the maintenance 
or loss of territorial integrity in the Republic of Georgia, ultimately attempting to identify the 
conditions which allowed Georgia to maintain its territorial integrity with regard to Ajaria but 
sustain losses concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  It will examine the political, economic 
and social conditions within Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia following the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in order to better understand their respective trajectories.  
 In order to contextualize this research project, I draw on theoretical frames developed by 
Barbara Walter and Monica Toft, and will explore five dimensions of Georgia's post-
independence conflict.  First, the historical dimension provides a logical map to the evolution of 
the relationship of Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the Georgian state and to how the 
                                                            
1  Juan Jose Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Transition and Consolidation. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), 16. 
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conflicts, that at times were contemporaneous to one another, played out in the course of history.  
Second, the nature of the domestic political situation in these territories. What are the 
characteristics of each sub-system, how do they differ or compare to one another? What are the 
mechanisms sustaining the current government framework?  What is the nature and degree of 
comparability between grievances among all three?  The third dimension encompasses the 
international influence in the three regions, particularly during times of a surge in conflict.  What 
role did supranational organizations such as the OSCE and the European Union, as well as the 
United States and Russia play in determining the course of these conflicts? Fourth, the 
geographic and territorial dimension and the concordant socio-economic components are equally 
as important.  For instance, what is the nature of cross-border kin relationships regarding South 
and North Ossetia? Are there strategic and economic assets that render certain regions more 
pertinent? The fifth dimension will focus on the constitution of ethnic identities in Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Ajaria and Georgia with the intent of examining how the conception of these 
identities played out in policymaking in the Soviet and Post-Soviet periods.   
Theory: Reputation Building and Indivisibility of Territory  
The framing for this project draws on several theoretical perspectives. Barbara F. Walter’s 
conceptualization of state calculation of reputation when facing multiple ethnic challengers is 
particularly relevant to the case of Georgia.2  Walter notes that reputation building is logical if 
there is potential for future irredentist or separatist movements.3  Reputation building is premised 
on an economic model put forth by Reinhard Selten.  The "chain store paradox" essentially holds 
                                                            
2 Barbara F. Walter, Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 3-5. 
3 Ibid. 24 
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that given the threat of a price war in one location, potential competitors will not enter into a 
market in that or any other locations dominated by an established store.4  The threat or 
engagement in price war will discourage potential competitors.  Walter uses this model to 
diagram conflict situations in order to understand the relationships between a government and 
ethnic groups making separatist appeals.5  Walter argues that governments will take into account 
current interests when considering compromise but will equally account for the effect a decision 
will have on other potential challengers.6  Walter also notes that just as governments are actively 
forward thinking, so too are ethnic groups who have the capacity to make separatist appeals.  A 
government willing to negotiate once gives encouragement that it might be willing to negotiate 
again.7  A domino effect is exactly what multi-ethnic states like Georgia want to avoid and why 
it is advantageous to engage in reputation building.  As separatist regions, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia not only infringe on Georgia's territorial integrity but also ensure its frailty as a 
democracy. 
 Donald Horowitz uses a variation of Lewis Coser's definition and posits that conflict "...is 
a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or 
otherwise eliminate rivals."8  However, the multifarious influences, that stretch in both breadth 
and depth, render settling on a theory somewhat cumbersome.  As Horowitz notes in his book 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict, theories of modernization concerning ethnicity, as well as theories 
which most prominently emphasize the juxtaposition of the forces of modernity with those of the 
                                                            
4 Library of Economics and Liberty. "The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Reinhard Selten." Accessed 
December 16, 2014. http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Selten.html.  
5 Walter, Barbara F. "Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others." American 
Journal of Political Science 50 (2006): 314, http://www.jstor.org.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/stable/3694275. 
6 Ibid. 313 
7 Walter, Barbara F. Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent. 27 
8 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 95. 
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past, maintain that modernizing forces create an antagonistic environment that can serve as an 
incubator for ethnic violence.  Horowitz notes that while modernizing forces can and often do 
influence ethnic conflict, as a theory it falls short in explaining the impetus of those who are not 
in the elite class.9  He substantiates his case by highlighting that "...ethnic conflict (and so much 
ethnic conflict that has gone as far as civil war) has occurred in some of the least modernized 
areas of the world: Chad, Ethiopia, the Southern Sudan, Mauritania, the mountainous areas of 
Iraq, Northeast India, the periphery of Burma, and Papua New Guinea."10  One might add South 
Ossetia and possibly Abkhazia, though to a lesser degree, to such a list.   
Additionally, the paper will draw from Monica Toft’s argument in The Geography of 
Ethnic Violence in order to adequately address the geographic and territorial dimensions of 
challenge to the state.  Importantly, Toft proposes a theory regarding the indivisibility of territory 
as it is conceived in the mind of both the ethnic group making separatist appeals for the territory 
on which it resides, and the state that perceives this claim as a threat to its territorial integrity and 
thus inseparable.11   
Several components of her framework offer useful analytic tools.  First, one of the 
conditions which allows for claims of self-determination stems directly from regional clustering 
of an ethnic group within a state, particularly if appeals for self determination are accompanied 
by historical claims to that territory.12  Unsurprisingly, she finds a positive correlation between 
the length of time an ethnic group has resided in a region and the propensity for violence.13  
                                                            
9 Ibid. 102. 
10 Ibid. 102-103. 
11 Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of 
 Territory. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 18-19. 
12Ibid., 19. 
13Ibid., 43. 
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These conditions for violence are exacerbated if there is evidence of historical animosity and 
grievance.   
Second, Toft emphasizes that states and ethnic groups relate to territory differently 
despite the fact that both consider territory critical to their survival.  Ethnic groups perceive land 
as an integral part of their identity, whereas states view the delineation of political borders as 
essential to territorial integrity and thus sovereignty-the authority and control over the state.14  
Thus, multi-national states serve as a prime indication that a government is less willing to 
negotiate.15  Put another way, Walter offers a hypothesis in a similar vein as Toft when outlining 
her theory on reputation building.  As Walter states “the greater the number of potential future 
challenges, the greater the value associated with deterrence is likely to be, and the more likely 
the government is to fight.”16  Notably, Walter includes caveats to the extent that governments 
will elect to engage in reputation building.  For example, how many realizable threats are 
possible from minority groups, if the land occupied by minority groups is of value-either geo-
strategically or in regard to constructed or natural resources, and finally if the government can 
afford to fight various minority groups.  As Walter concludes, the more cost incurred in a fight 
for valuable territory, the more advantageous it will be for a government to engage in reputation 
building.17       
Finally, Toft points to the location and quantity of resources considered strategic or 
valuable, concerning those both natural and constructed is important insofar as it allows for 
increased mobilization previous to or during conflict.  However, the quantity and value of 
                                                            
14 Ibid., 19-20. 
15 Ibid., 43. 
16 Walter, Barbara F, Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent. 24. 
17 Ibid. 
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resources is not a key motivator in violence.18  Indeed, Toft's findings indicate higher levels of 
violence on territory lacking strategic resources, defined in this instance "...as minerals, dams 
and river systems, pasture and farmlands, industries, and strategically important locales (for 
example, mountain passes or heights)."19  The following discussion concerning the separatist 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria will be 
analyzed within this framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid., 42. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS 
An historical assessment of Georgian territorial development gives ample warning of its 
post-independence stateness challenges in the 1990s, accenting both discontinuities and 
grievances. External actors and internal challenges repeatedly reconfigured Georgia’s 
relationship to the three regions.    
Of considerable importance is the fact that Georgia itself was historically contested 
territory. Annexed by the tsarist empire in 1801, Georgia briefly regained independence from 
1918 to 1921 following the empire’s collapse, until it was absorbed by the Soviet Union.20  A 
periodically fractious Soviet Republic, it was one of the early republics seeking to secede from 
the Soviet Union. 
Historically, Georgia’s sub-national regions were equally contested.  Each of the 
challengers to Georgian stateness was and is distinguishable in some or all of its identity 
components from ethnic Georgians.  Both South Ossetians and Abkhazians are ethnically distinct 
from Georgians, and while Russian is widespread, maintain their respective native languages, 
both of which are dissimilar to Georgian and each other.  Indeed, the Abkhaz language is North 
Caucasian while the Ossetian language falls within the Iranian language group.21  At the same 
time, the territory on which each resides has historically been in demographic flux.  As Hille 
shows in her book State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, from 1897 to 1939 
                                                            
20 Stephen Jones, Georgia: A Political History since Independence. (London: I.B. Tauris &Co. Ltd., 2013), 43. 
21 Julie A. George, The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 97-98. 
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the native Abkhazian population went from constituting the majority of the population to one 
that was overwhelmingly outnumbered by Russians and Georgians.22 
The territorial status of all three groups oscillated over time, and none of them were 
consistently part of Georgia in the modern period.  Only under the aegis of the Soviet Union in 
1936 would the demarcation of the boundaries currently claimed by Georgia come into effect. 
South Ossetia transferred from Tbilisi's administration to that of the Russian Empire in 1801.23  
Abkhazia was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1810 as a Principality with a native 
prince, and maintained that status until 1864 when it came under direct Russian rule.24 
  Crucial insight into Georgia’s ongoing stateness problem is afforded by the Russian 
Civil War (1918-1922) that followed the onset of Communist rule.  This interregnum war 
profoundly influenced the movements for independence in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 
the context of hostility between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, the latter of which 
predominated in Georgia and the surrounding areas.25  Ultimately the Bolsheviks took power and 
the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was created in November of 1921, 
comprised of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.26  However, ambitions for autonomy on behalf 
of sizable numbers of Abkhaz and South Ossetians existed prior to the formation of an 
independent Georgian state.27  Indeed, discussions were underway during the Russian Civil War 
                                                            
22 Charlotte Mathilde Louis Hille, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus.  114. (Leiden: Brill 
Publishers, 2010), 10.1163/ej.9789004179011.i-350. 
23Ibid., 110. 
24 Ibid.,113  
25Cory Welt, "A Fateful Moment: Ethnic Autonomy and Revolutionary Violence in the Democratic Republic of 
Georgia (1918-21)," in The Making of Modern Georgia 1918-2012:The First Georgian Republic and its Successors. 
Stephen Jones (ed.) (New York: Routledge, 2014), 208. 
26 Hille, Charlotte Mathilde Louis, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, 209. 
27 Cory Welt, "A Fateful Moment: Ethnic Autonomy and Revolutionary Violence in the Democratic Republic of 
Georgia (1918-21)," in The Making of Modern Georgia 1918-2012:The First Georgian Republic and its Successors. 
Stephen Jones (ed.), 205-206. 
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for autonomy regarding both.28  In South Ossetia, this met a devastating end.  After revolutionary 
violence in South Ossetia in May of 1920, Georgia employed its military force which resulted in 
ethnic cleansing.29  The discussion for autonomy was more protracted for Abkhazia.  The 
Abkhazian People's Council sought Georgian support for a new independent state.30  Part of this 
support was to appeal to Georgian forces to consolidate authority for a new Abkhazian state by 
suppressing minority factions.31  Georgia did not want Abkhazian sovereignty and thus did not 
acquiesce.  Still, Abkhazia faced unrest and the need for stability necessitated incorporation into 
the Georgian state.32  However, characteristically, Abkhazia is more akin to the North Caucasus 
both ethno-linguistically and because of its historical political trajectory under direct Russian 
rule.33  Concordant with its previous orientation, the political attitude of Abkhazians fell even 
more in line with the North Caucasus and Russia as opposed to assuming a South Caucasian 
identity.34  Moreover, South Ossetia has cross border kin in North Ossetia and currently 
maintains greater ethnic homogeneity than Abkhazia, in part due to the porous border.   
During the period of Georgian independence, which coincided with the Russian Civil 
War, South Ossetians also raised aspirations to join North Ossetians in a united political 
administration.  However, the establishment of the Soviet Union brought a reconfiguration of 
territorial boundaries rendering South and North Ossetia separate territories and making South 
Ossetia an Autonomous Oblast within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.35  In 1921, 
                                                            
28Ibid., 206. 
29 Ibid.   
30 Ibid., 214. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Derluguian, Georgi., "The Forgotten Abkhazia: Anatomy of Post-Socialist Ethnic War." Northwestern University 
Policy Memo (PONARS, 2000). http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0163.pdf, 2. 
34 Cory Welt, "A Fateful Moment: Ethnic Autonomy and Revolutionary Violence in the Democratic Republic of 
Georgia (1918-21)," in The Making of Modern Georgia 1918-2012:The First Georgian Republic and its Successors. 
Stephen Jones (ed.), 211. 
35  Hille, Charlotte Mathilde Louis, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, 112. 
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Abkhazia was made a Soviet Socialist Republic (independent from and equal in republican status 
to Georgia).  However, in 1936 the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was 
disbanded and Abkhazia's status was reduced to an Autonomous Oblast within Georgia, thus 
losing its independence from Georgia.  It was only then that all three challengers were 
incorporated into the Georgia that would become independent in 1991.  
The historical trajectory of Ajaria assumed a different path.  Ajaria was appropriated in 
1878, as a result of the Berlin Conference, by the Russian Empire after being under the auspices 
of the Ottoman Empire for three centuries.36  As Pelkmans notes "Georgian became less 
important in the course of the nineteenth century.  In the 1870s it was spoken only at home, and 
the men predominately spoke Turkish in public."37  Then effectively under Russia's control, 
many Ajarians left for Turkey which in turn confused many in the Georgian elite who perceived 
the Ajarians as Georgian.38  However, religious identity was integral to daily life for the majority 
of Ajarians, and now under a different power whose state religion was Orthodox, many feared 
either discrimination or suppression of Islam.39  Indeed, during WWI sympathies largely 
remained with the Ottoman Turks and not Russia or Georgia.40 Given the history it is 
unsurprising that Ajaria did not favor Georgian independence in 1918.41  Throughout the Soviet 
period, Ajaria was an ASSR (Avtonomnaia Sovetskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika) within the 
                                                            
36 Mathijs Pelkmans, Defending the Border: Identity, Religion, and Modernity in the Republic of Georgia.(Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 95.  
37 Ibid., 97. 
38 Ibid., 98. 
39 Ibid., 98-100. 
40 Ibid., 101. 
41 "Ajarians: Historical Context."World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, accessed December 4, 
2014, http://www.minorityrights.org/1947/georgia/ajarians.html. 
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Soviet Republic of Georgia.  Additionally, unlike Abkhazian or Ossetians, Ajarians did not 
classify as an ethnic minority despite difference in religion.42   
Ajaria borders Turkey across the Black Sea.  This geographic position continues to offer 
opportunities that are unavailable to South Ossetia, such as ports, trade, and oil refineries.43  
Historically, Batumi is an essential port along the Black Sea, and in addition to trade, it is home 
to a number of oil refineries and pipelines.  Indeed, today the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline traverses Georgia by way of Tbilisi for international export.44  There is an additional 
pipeline which terminates in Batumi.  Due to its strategic location and resources, the Russian 
Empire first became invested in the region in the late 1900s.45  In fact, the Russian military 
maintained a base in Batumi until 2007.46  Ajaria did not endure conflict with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, as did South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Under Toft's criteria this is logical.  There are 
no ethnic minority groups in Ajaria and as mentioned it has maintained a healthy economy due to 
its commodities and position on the Black Sea.  Further, because Ajarians conceptualize their 
identity as Georgian, they also perceive of the land in much the same regard.  The autonomy that 
Ajarians have is in governing and civil functions, it is not an ethno- geographic distinction.  
However, as noted above, it is codified in law that Ajaria is subject to the Georgian government.  
                                                            
42 Monica Duffy Toft, "Multinationality, Regions and State Building: The Failed Transition in Georgia," in Ethnicity 
and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict, eds. James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 128. 
43British Broadcasting Company, "Regions and Territories: Ajaria," last updated 22 November 2011, accessed 
December 3, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3520322.stm. 
44"Azerbaijan," U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed December 13, 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=aj. 
45 Toft, Monica Duffy, "Multinationality, Regions and State Building: The Failed Transition in Georgia," in 
Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict, eds. James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, 
127. 
46 British Broadcasting Company, "Regions and Territories: Ajaria," last updated, 22 November 2011, accessed 
December 3, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3520322.stm. 
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Indeed, the impetus for conflict in Ajaria in 2004 was regional rather than ethnic or religious.47  
The particularities of the contention between Batumi and Tbilisi in 2004 will be analyzed in 
more detail in later sections. 
  The historical trajectories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Ajaria assumed different, 
though not dissimilar, orientations that have considerably influenced each of their situations at 
present.  For example, all three regions were subject to the imperializing forces of the Russian 
Empire.  However, any economic consolidation of resources accompanied by a building of 
infrastructure which resulted from Russian imperialization profited Abkhazia and Ajaria 
primarily, and to a lesser extent, South Ossetia.  For its part, South Ossetia serves as the 
intermediary connecting Russia by way of the Georgian Military Road which was finished in 
1863 by the Russian military and stretches from Vladikavkaz in Ingushetia to Tbilisi.48  The 
nature of Russia's actions in each region was very much determined by how each could be 
exploited.  Toft's framework maintains that the deprivation of resources in a given area directly 
correlates to a rise in violence.  This theory appears to fit the cases of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, albeit from opposite ends in regard to the amount of resources.  South Ossetia lacks 
the strategic resources that Toft illustrates, and for its part, South Ossetia was the first to descend 
into violence in the pre and post Soviet period.  As George notes, while both wars were brutal 
and destructive, part of the willingness on the part of the Abkhazians to negotiate derives from 
not wanting any further destruction of their infrastructure which was heavily dismantled by 
                                                            
47 "Ajarians: Historical Context," World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, accessed December 4, 
2014, http://www.minorityrights.org/1947/georgia/ajarians.html. 
48"Military Road. Fortress in the Dariel Ravine , Caucasus , Russia," World Digital Library, last updated February 4, 
2015, http://www.wdl.org/en/item/4219/. 
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fighting during the war.49  The lack of resources in South Ossetia rendered it little aid in terms of 
building lucrative infrastructure.   
 However, as mentioned above, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were part of the Russian 
empire from 1801 in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1810 as a principality.  They 
would remain part of the Russian Empire until its fall.  Ajaria did not come under Russian rule 
until 1878 after being influenced by the Ottoman Empire, as noted above.  Historically, Russian 
administration in Abkhazia and South Ossetia lends itself as precedent for current involvement.  
Russia is able to act as the guarantor of the currently de facto states of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia but is simultaneously protecting its geostrategic pursuits directly south of its border.  
Further, the Abkhaz and South Ossetians are both North Caucasian peoples, of which the latter 
has cross border kin in Russia proper (in the North Ossetia- Alania Autonomous Okrug).  
Despite Ajarians being a part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, Ajarians are considered 
ethnically Georgian and thus South Caucasian.   
 Additionally, the population shifts over time varied greatly between the three regions.  
Part of Toft's framework posits that population clustering regarding ethnic groups, directly 
affects the potential for violence.  This can be substantiated in the case of Abkhazia (in which 
97% of ethnic Abkhazians resided in Abkhazia in 1989) but not South Ossetia which did not 
have significant ethnic clustering in that same year, as only 39% of South Ossetians were living 
in South Ossetia and yet both situations turned violent.50  Additionally, South Ossetia 
experienced violence and ethnic cleansing during the Russian Civil War (in 1920), as it pursued 
greater autonomy together with Abkhazia.  Abkhazia experienced internal unrest at the same 
                                                            
49 George, Julie A, The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia, 123. 
50 Ibid., 22. 
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time but managed to avoid violence on the scale of South Ossetia.  At this point it is important to 
ask the following: to what extent are the respective histories of the regions congruent with 
Monica Toft's theoretical framework put forth in the theory section of this project? This turbulent 
and violent time created the modern day grievances and antagonisms which follow Toft's 
prescription. Mainly that the likelihood and degree of violence increases if there is an extant 
combination in which an ethnic group has historical claims to the land while simultaneously 
claiming grievances against another ethnic group.51  The history of these regions cannot be 
ignored when attempting to analyze the current state of affairs due to history having great 
bearing on the different regional orientations.  Ajaria is currently much more stable than 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia because it did not descend into conflict and war after the fall of the 
Soviet Union and subsequent Georgian independence.  Indeed its history of relative economic 
prosperity, in comparison to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, also greatly contributes to its current 
stability.  Additionally, while Ajaria did witness population shifts, it did not experience the mass 
migration that took place in Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the wars of the early 1990s.  
Throughout Ajaria's history, it maintained ethnic homogeneity even when under Ottoman control 
and this homogeneity is especially the case when compared to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
Further, Ajaria harbors few significant grievances against Tbilisi.  In this regard, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia differ.   
 The following chapter offers a discussion on Soviet ethno-federalism and the ways in 
which this policy influenced the three regions, their relationship to one another and to Tbilisi, 
both during the Soviet period and post independence.  It will explain, as several scholars in the 
field have already done, that the dynamic web of relationships between the players is indeed 
                                                            
51 Toft, Monica Duffy, The Geography of Ethnic Violence, 43. 
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partly responsible for independence appeals after Soviet collapse.  Not least because the laws 
that Moscow codified protected minority rights, even if not consistently practiced.  The chapter 
will also explain why such a policy was implemented under a system which appeared inherently 
antagonistic to difference.        
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CHAPTER 2 
SOVIET ETHNO-FEDERALISM 
 It would be remiss to exclude the discourse of Soviet ethno-federalism from this project 
because ethno-federalism aided the creation of separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia for reasons 
that will be discussed below.  As Grigoryan notes, Communist ideology is an enemy of 
nationalism and so the question of this propulsion towards a federalist structure, which inherently 
grants a modicum of flexibility in governance, must be analyzed.   
 Due to the multi-ethnic composition of the Soviet Union and the necessity to make Soviet 
ideology available to all, it was necessary to translate into the vernacular.  However, as 
Grigoryan notes further, the most influential reason for ethno-federalism was that "[t]hey had to 
find a way to deal with an already unleashed monster-the mobilized nationalisms, or the 
simmering nationalist discontent, that would have led to new mobilizations if preemptive 
concessions were not made."52  In other words, it is the condition of pre-existing nationalities at 
the inception of the Soviet project which rendered ethno-federalism appealing despite the 
counterintuitive nature of ethno-federalism to communist ideology.  The political mechanisms 
established with autonomous republics and regions, and their development over time meant that 
such institutions were in place at the time of the drive for independence.53  Additionally, under 
Soviet rule, theoretically though not always in practice, minority rights were elevated, sometimes 
to the extent that their representation in governing bodies was disproportionate to the percentage 
of the population belonging to a particular minority.  In Abkhazia, despite enduring repressive 
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measures in the Stalinist period and to a lesser degree under Khrushchev, by 1989 Abkhazians 
held more seats in the Abkhaz parliament than ethnic Georgians despite Georgians constituting a 
majority in Abkhazia.54  This fact in particular fostered animosity on behalf of ethnic Georgians 
who were clustered in the Gali region of Abkhazia until the 1992 war forced many Georgians to 
flee.  Policies of minority elevation, though inconsistently practiced, made belonging to a certain 
ethnic identity valuable, in terms of political and social capital.55   
 This degree of minority protection disintegrated along with the Soviet Union.  This 
condition coincided with a resurgence of nationalism that was simultaneous with calls for 
independence on behalf of the Republics.  In the case of Georgia, the acting government (though 
that term is used loosely) resurrected its constitution from its brief period of independence from 
1918-1921, which did not allow for autonomous administrative units.56  Thus, the administrative 
units and governing mechanisms that existed for most of the 20th century, were threatened by the 
restoration of a sovereign Georgian state.   
 The next chapter will detail identity evolution in the Soviet period.  It will discuss the 
identity formation of Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia; explaining the vulnerability of 
minorities regarding their relationship to Tbilisi as well as Moscow, and the degree of difference 
and comparison among the three regions.  It will also outline the extent to which minority rights 
were at times severely repressed and at other times elevated.  Additionally, there is a brief 
discussion in regard to how the federalist structure influenced the negotiating power of regions 
holding different statuses.   
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CHAPTER 3  
IDENTITY EVOLUTION IN THE SOVIET PERIOD 
Prior to 1922, which saw its incorporation into the Soviet Union as an Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Ajarians were predominately Muslim but not classified as a distinct 
ethnic group until the 1926 Soviet census.  In the 1939 Soviet census, the Ajar distinction was 
abandoned.57  Still, even the brief labeling of an identity left a portion of the population 
conceptualizing their identity as Ajar, not Georgian.58  However, Soviet policy in the 1920s 
involved religious suppression and was followed by reaffirmation of the autonomy of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church, that resulted in Ajaria's population identifying as overwhelmingly 
Christian Orthodox at present.59  Importantly, unlike Abkhazians and South Ossetians, Ajarians 
are ethnically Georgian and due to assimilation policies in the Soviet period, most conceptualize 
their ethnic identity as Georgian.60  At the same time, it is important to mention a degree of 
ambiguity present when referring to Ajarian identity.  Much of this ambiguity stems from the 
unique history of Ajaria in regard to it being heavily influenced by the Ottoman Empire.  As 
noted previously, during the 19th century the Ottoman Turks established military outposts in 
Ajaria; Ajaria even allied with the Ottomans during the Crimean War, in which it was fighting 
Georgians and Russians.61  Moreover, the few students from elite families were educated in 
Turkey.  This in turn influenced political, social and economic development of the region to one 
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19 
 
more affiliated with Turkey.62  However, as the power of the Ottoman Empire waned, so did its 
influence over its periphery.  The power dynamics significantly altered with the Treaty of Berlin 
in 1878, which as noted above, forced the Ottoman Empire to cede Ajaria to the Russian Empire.  
As Hoch and Kopecek note, the Berlin Treaty also contained a clause remnant from the Treaty of 
San Stefano which stipulated that Ajarian Muslims leave for Turkey.63  This was followed by an 
influx of Christians from the Kakheti region of Georgia, ultimately resulting in a change of 
demographics to one that was substantially Orthodox Christian.64  To this day, a major tenet of 
Georgian nationalism is Georgian Orthodoxy.  Ajaria was situated at the center of a geopolitical 
power struggle in the age of great empires, to a greater extent than Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
due to the involvement of the Ottoman Empire.  In fact, for most of its existence Ajaria extended 
into Northeastern Turkey.  It was not until the Treaty of Versailles, which dismantled the 
Ottoman Empire, that the current borders of Ajaria came into effect.65  Indeed, though Ajaria 
historically came under the jurisdiction of multiple entities, it never made separatist claims.  For 
instance, as noted above, Ajarians identify as ethnic Georgian.  It was a result of the dominance 
of Islam, not language, at the time of its absorption into the Soviet Union that rendered it an 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within Georgia.66  Ajarians speak the same language, 
albeit a different dialect, and at present predominately identify as Georgian Christian Orthodox.67  
The current ethnographic make up of Ajaria is consistent with other Georgian subgroups such as 
Svans and Mingrelians.  Ajaria's history took a very different course than those of Abkhazia and 
                                                            
62 Ibid., 7. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 8. 
66 Monica Duffy Toft, Monica Duffy Toft, "Multinationality, Regions and State Building: The Failed Transition in 
Georgia," in Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict, eds. James Hughes and 
Gwendolyn Sasse,128. 
67British Broadcasting Company, "Regions and Territories: Ajaria," last updated, 22 November 2011, accessed 
December 3, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3520322.stm. 
20 
 
South Ossetia.  Additionally, and insofar as precedents are concerned, Ajaria did not have a 
history of independence or of initiating irredentist appeals.  Excepting religion, it also faced less 
repression during the Soviet period due to approximation in language.  Thus many aspects of 
Georgian chauvinism did not parallel the profound and divisive effects in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  Particularly because the Georgian Language State Program focused on mandating 
Georgian as the official language of anything connected to the state.  As Jones rightly notes, 
Georgians "...believe, like most former Soviet citizens, in the concept of linguistic nationality.  
Political boundaries should reflect linguistic ones, and the dominant linguistic nation within the 
state should determine language policy."68  In contrast to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ajarian 
ethnic identity is more solidly Georgian, despite religious differences, which are substantially 
less influential now than they were in the 19th century.  These particularities will be brought into 
sharp relief in the following section in which the political trajectories of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia are shown to be very different in the wake of Georgian independence in 1991.   
  During the Soviet period from 1937 to 1953, South Ossetians and Abkhazians endured 
ethnically charged discrimination policies.  Pursuant with Georgian policy, ethnic minorities in 
Georgia underwent deportation.  This included Laz, Greeks, Khemshins, Meskhetian Turks, and 
Kurds.69  Ethnic Georgians settled in their stead, eventually relegating native Abkhazians to a 
small minority.  Ethnic homogenization assumed a different yet deleterious orientation toward 
Abkhazians.  It became illegal to teach the Ossetian and Abkhaz languages and hence all school 
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instruction was relayed in Georgian and administered under Georgian institutions.70   
Additionally, Georgian academics wrote and propagated the falsity that Abkhazians were an 
extension of the Kartvelian family and thus Georgian.71  The Abkhaz alphabet shifted from one 
premised on Cyrillic script, which was then followed by Latin, to one derived from the Georgian 
alphabet.  This effectively neutralized the capability to produce and consume media and literary 
culture in native Abkhaz.  Further, the official language of public records was mandated to be in 
Georgian despite the fact that more than half of the population, which included Russians and 
Armenians, were illiterate in the Georgian language.72  As a consequence of these policies, many 
Russians and Armenians left in the early 1950s because it became impossible to sustain their 
livelihood.73  Conditions slightly improved under Khrushchev in the 1950s with a series of 
policies targeted to raise the quotas of Abkhazians enrolled in university and celebrate the 
culture, much to the dismay of Georgians living within Abkhazia.74  However, this did not last 
and in the coming decades, as late as 1977, conditions prompted prominent Abkhazians to appeal 
to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in order to seek 
unification with the Soviet Union.75  After decades of Georgian intolerance, the population of 
native Abkhaz residing in Abkhazia registered at less than one fifth.76  Perestroika ushered in 
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previously suppressed freedoms but many were restricted to Georgians, as the establishment of 
new institutions created no place for ethnic minorities.77  Of the three regions, South Ossetia was 
more underdeveloped throughout the Soviet period.  As an Autonomous Oblast, it was situated 
below both Ajaria and Abkhazia (both having ASSR status) and thus held less negotiating 
power.78  
 The primary objective of this chapter was to emphasize and illustrate how identity 
evolution in the Soviet period was particularistic within each region. Further, it is notable that 
population shifts regarding deportations of Georgia's minorities and intermigration irritated 
preexisting tensions.  Further, regional status afforded Ajaria and Abkhazia more opportunity to 
negotiate with Moscow and to some extent Tbilisi, as they maintained more jurisdiction over 
their regional administrations, particularly under Gorbachev.  The following chapter will identify 
how the disparities in identity formation shaped Abkhazian and South Ossetian claims for 
autonomy in 1991.   It will then turn to the violence that ensued initially in South Ossetia and 
later in Abkhazia as well as the involvement on behalf of the Georgian government, Russia, the 
United States, EU and international institutions.   
 
 
 
 
                                                            
77 Marc Weller, Barbara Metzger and Niall Johnson, Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power- Sharing 
in Theory and Practice, (Leiden: BRILL, 2008), 349. 
78 Ibid.  
*Soviet hierarchical structure dictated more legal and negotiating rights to certain status classifications.  For 
example, Autonomous Oblasts held the least power.  Autonomous Regions were usually granted to large minorities 
but were still subject to the Soviet Republics (such as Georgia).The Republics maintained control over both AOs 
and ASSRs but were subject to directives from Moscow. 
23 
 
CHAPTER 4  
POST-SOVIET POLICY IN GEORGIA 
This chapter will describe the feebleness of the Georgian state at the time of 
independence and how in the fight for Georgian sovereignty this weakness led to policies which 
were detrimental to its territorial integrity and plunged the Georgian state into war.  Further, it 
will detail the conflicts and their irresolution; the nature of which prevents Georgia from 
becoming a consolidated state.  
At the time of the Soviet collapse, the strength of the Georgian Republic was faltering to 
the extent that it lacked any kind of substantive influence over Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Ajaria.79  As George notes in The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia, " [t]he 
inability of the state and disinterest of the government in building political institutions addressing 
territorial fragmentation meant that bi-lateral negotiations such as those between Tatarstan and 
the Russian government would be difficult to conduct."80  After Georgia declared independence 
in March of 1991, South Ossetia appealed for an upgrade in status as an Autonomous Republic 
but was categorically rejected.81  A newly independent Georgia was not in favor of any action 
that would weaken its new sovereign authority.82  Anxieties were further exacerbated on the eve 
of elections for a new parliament when the Supreme Soviet decreed that it would only allow 
nation-wide parties to run; regional parties were barred.83  This prompted the refusal on behalf of 
the South Ossetian Popular Front to accept the validity of the elections and in turn it held a 
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separate election.  Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the newly elected leader of the Round Table bloc, and 
first president of an independent Georgia, not only nullified that election but also South Ossetia's 
status as Autonomous Oblast.84  
Gamsakhurdia's nationalist fervor and policies came at the expense of minorities.  
Interestingly, Gamsakhurdia was initially more amenable to negotiations regarding Abkhazia 
than South Ossetia because he "believed in a romantic ethnic theory that the Abkhaz, along with 
the Chechens, were "real" Caucasians, just like the Georgians."85  Gamsakhurdia was a 
prominent member of the Georgian movement for independence.  Incidentally, and not without 
pressure from the KGB, he instigated the fracture in the Georgian independence movement.86  
He emerged as the leader who would bring Georgia its independence from the Soviet Union and 
unlike his successor Eduard Shevardnadze, Moscow understood that Gamsakhurdia was 
positioned to do so and took actions to ensure that Tbilisi would remain in the Russian sphere of 
influence.87  Areshidze argues that for this reason, Moscow exploited separatist sentiments first 
in South Ossetia and then later in Abkhazia in order to combat the nationalist and populist 
policies propagated by Gamsakhurdia in particular.88   
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Conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
Conflict broke out in South Ossetia in 1989 and lasted until July 1992, resulting in over 1,000 
casualties and 60,000 internally displaced persons.89 During the conflict, ethnic Georgians in the 
conflict region relocated to core parts of Georgia and many Ossetians joined their kin across the 
border in North Ossetia.90  This caused a shift in the ethnographic balance in favor of South 
Ossetians who now constituted more than half of the population within South Ossetia.91  At 
present, the distribution is overwhelmingly South Ossetian with Georgians comprising not more 
than a third of the total population.92  That same year, the South Ossetians held a referendum 
deciding whether to reunite with Russia and more than 99% voted for reunification.93      
 
 Likewise, tension between Georgians and Abkhazians gained momentum in 1989 as the 
division between Georgian calls for complete independence from the Soviet Union and Abkhaz 
wishes to remain grew louder.94  This manifested itself in public institutions such as Sukhumi 
University in the Abkhaz capital.  Georgian instructors separated from the university and their 
Russian and Abkhazian counterparts, set up an offshoot of Tbilisi State University and 
subsequently incurred the ire of Abkhazians, leaving 16 dead.95  Georgia denounced the Soviet 
Union in November of 1989 and the following year announced its sovereignty.  In turn Abkhazia 
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declared itself a sovereign entity within the Soviet Union.96  The Supreme Soviet in Abkhazia 
came under the leadership of Vladislav Ardzinba who called for separate Abkhaz elections and 
further entrenched hostility between Sukhumi and the Gamsakhurdia government.97  At this time, 
Ardzinba was already in negotiations with the Soviets for military support.  This engendered a 
temporary compromise in which representation within parliament in Sukhumi was premised on a 
fixed number of seats; 28 Abkhaz and 26 Georgian.98   
 A change of Georgian leadership then intervened in the conflict.  By the end of 1991, 
Gamsakhurdia lost favor with the Georgian National Guard and after a coup he was forced to 
flee.  Subsequently Shevardnadze assumed leadership.99  However, Shevardnadze did not have 
immediate control over the Georgian government or indeed certain regions.  The Mkhedrioni, a 
force personally established by Gamsakhurdia for mobilization in South Ossetia (alongside the 
National Guard) returned from Tskhinvali to Tbilisi and fought against forces still loyal to 
Gamsakhurdia.100  As Areshidze notes, the Russian military provided materiel in support of the 
coup and simultaneously urged Gamsakhurdia to hold his position, thereby contributing to the 
chaos.101  However, after reaching the conclusion that he could not remain in Tbilisi, 
Gamsakhurdia escaped to Grozny where he planned to regroup.  However his further attempts to 
win back his position failed and he passed away at the end of 1993.102 
 In 1992 the Abkhaz parliament disbanded and calls for independence reinvigorated.  This 
developed into war by the summer and heavy fighting continued until 1993, killing 10,000 and 
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wounding 8,000.103  Notably, Russia was involved in both wars to varying degrees, however its 
program in the region vacillated from one of withdrawal to one of chauvinism.104  The 
ambiguous nature of Russia's foreign policy toward Georgia and its separatist regions originated 
from discontinuity of orientations that Moscow's own post soviet policy assumed.  For example, 
President Yeltsin vocally supported Georgian sovereignty at the same time that some in the 
Duma supported the separatist path embarked upon by Abkhazia and South Ossetia.105 As put 
forth by Beat Kernen and Matthew Sussex, Russian policy in the 1990s, and particularly after 
peace was made at Sochi in 1993, could be argued as one of containment which "...reflected 
classic geostrategic objectives, linked to the domestically rooted fear of spillover, as well as to 
the external fact that the breakaway regions welcomed the Russian presence on their territory as 
a guarantee of their security."106  In this sense, it could be argued that Russia and Georgia share a 
mutual goal of maintaining or protecting territorial integrity but their respective methods to 
realize those goals are diametrically opposed to each other.  Notably, after Shevardnadze was 
removed from power and succeeded by Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgian advances for a fully 
integrated democratic state became more stalwart in character than under the previous 
administration.  Most importantly, aside from reunification of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with 
Georgia proper, Saakashvili decisively oriented Georgia to the West, in regard to NATO, the EU 
and other Western institutions and security paradigms. Further, the former President sought to 
reclaim and advance Georgia's energy capacity, specifically pipelines, and finally, to work 
                                                            
103 Ibid., 188. 
104 Ibid., 197. 
105 Sussex, Matthew (ed.), Conflict in the Former USSR. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 96. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511980565. 
106 Ibid., p.96. 
28 
 
toward a freer state economy.107  Much of this required a genuine effort to combat the network of 
corruption which tentacles seemed boundless.  Not only within the government or the police 
force but also regarding South Ossetia and the Ergneti Market, which was subsequently shut 
down by Saakashvili after he assumed leadership.  In fact, closing the Ergneti Market 
exacerbated tensions, as it served as a life source for many impoverished living in South Ossetia, 
Georgians and Ossetians alike.108  As George notes, Saakashvili's closure of the Ergneti Market 
in 2004 ultimately engendered more support for Eduard Kokoity, the president of the de facto 
South Ossetian government.109   
 During the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s, the international 
institutions (particularly, the OSCE, United Nations) implemented measures to resolve violence.  
In South Ossetia, in June of 1992, an arbitration agreement was signed in Sochi, Russia between 
then Russian President Boris Yeltsin and former Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze.  Under 
the agreement, a Joint Control Commission was instituted with participants from Russia, 
Georgia, North and South Ossetia and the OSCE.110  As well as providing a mandate for Russian, 
Ossetian and Georgian troops to police the former conflict zone, the measures outlined in this 
framework would 
 
  ...supervise the observance of the agreement, draft and implement conflict settlement 
 measures, promote dialogue and political settlement, devise and carry out measures to 
 facilitate refugee and IDP return, solve problems related to economic reconstruction in the 
 zone of conflict, and monitor human rights.111 
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In Abkhazia, the United Nations, in congress with the OSCE (at that time CSCE) conducted 
negotiations and authorized peacekeeping monitors in zones of conflict.  Two ceasefire 
agreements disintegrated prior to the ceasefire in May of 1994.  This agreement provided 
peacekeepers from the Commonwealth of Independent States with a mandate, under the 
guidance of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), to enforce the 
ceasefire.112  The war in Abkhazia not only resulted in mass casualties and internally displaced 
persons but extensive violations of human rights by both the Abkhaz and Georgian forces.113  
The UNOMIG mandate was renewed until 2009 when it was terminated due to failure of 
agreement among members of the Security Council.114  Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
the OSCE, European Union and Council of Europe, as well as smaller institutions, remained 
engaged in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to help stabilize and continue negotiations.115  
Additionally an OSCE Mission was established in Tbilisi to implement democratic institutions 
and practices.116  
 In the immediate aftermath of Georgia's independence the authoritarian elements of 
governance that the state adopted and implemented towards its minorities, especially under 
Gamsakhurdia's leadership drove a fragile state government further into chaos and led to war.  
The consequences of which hardened grievances and placed Russian forces in zones of conflict 
in order to monitor the environment.  After the violent wars of the early 1990s, the conflicts were 
left frozen and seemingly intractable. The hardening of grievances combined with the destruction 
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of infrastructure, devastated economies and presence of Russian troops helped set the conditions 
leading to the war in 2008.    
 The next chapter will address Georgian state policy in Ajaria, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  Particularly paying attention to Tbilisi's reassertion of control over Ajaria and attempts 
by the Georgian government to bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia back under Tbilisi's influence.   
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CHAPTER 5  
GEORGIAN POLICY TOWARD AJARIA, SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA IN THE 
21st CENTURY 
 
 It was the 2003 Rose Revolution, which overthrew Eduard Shevardnadze, that enabled 
Mikheil Saakashvili to win presidential elections.  Saakashvili declared his intent from the outset 
"to restore Georgia's territorial integrity, to establish control over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia."117  As a consequence of this objective, Saakashvili's policies reignited what had 
previously been frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  As mentioned, one of the main 
objectives Saakashvili sought for Georgia was full democratization.  However, with three 
separate entities, and each with their own de facto governments, the task was not easy.   
 Saakashvili dealt with Ajaria and its long-time corrupt leader Aslan Abashidze, who was 
politically close to Shevardnadze.  As such Shevardnadze allowed him to ignore Ajaria's 
obligations as part of the Georgian state, such as paying Tbilisi various taxes, particularly those 
connected to trade.118  Saakashvili was unwilling to accept this modus vivendi.  The political 
climate was very tenuous and contributed to the outbreak of the Ajarian conflict in 2004.  
Notably, it resulted from a power struggle between Saakashvili and Abashidze and unlike 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia was unrelated to irredentism.119  Yet, it was fueled by the need for 
Tbilisi to regain control of the government in Ajaria.  Abashidze did not recognize Saakashvili's 
authority and proclaimed a state of emergency.120  The militia force under Abashidze mobilized 
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and dismantled the bridges linking Ajaria to Georgia proper.121  After mass demonstrations in 
Batumi, Abashidze fled to Moscow with the aid of the previous Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov.122  With Abashidze and his contemporaries effectively neutralized, Saakashvili brought 
Ajaria further into Tbilisi's orbit.  This is most transparent in the Law of the Autonomous 
Republic of Ajara On Structure, Authorities, And Rules for Activities of Government of the 
Autonomous Republic of Ajara in which article two states:  
[t]he structure, authority, and procedure of the Government activity shall be determined 
 by the Constitutional Law of Georgia “On Status of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara”, 
 proper legal acts of Georgia, normative acts by President of Georgia, the Constitution of 
 the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, the present law, and other appropriate legal acts.123   
 
Saakashvili was praised for his deft and swift handling of the crisis.  However, as is rightly noted 
in the literature, his success was predicated on the distinctive particularities of Ajaria.124  
Protracted conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to prove more difficult if not 
impenetrable.125  Saaksahvili's plan for Ajaria contained fewer snares than that for Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.  The core problem was that his program consisted of conflicting aspirations.  On 
the one hand, he wanted to delegate more policy making powers to the separatist regions in order 
to bring them back into the fold.  On the other, he strategically called on Georgian nationalism in 
order to appeal to Georgians.  This effectively threatened Abkhazia and South Ossetia who saw 
the government's simultaneous investment in the Georgian military a great cause for concern. 126  
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Additionally, Saakashvili proposed renovating infrastructure in Abkhazia, namely the railroad 
traversing its territory and connecting Georgia to Russia.  However, this was met with distrust by 
both the de facto Abkhazian government and Georgia for similar reasons.  The Abkhazians a 
functioning railroad as giving too much power to Georgia and some within the Georgian 
government believed the railroad would give even more regional leverage to Russia.127  
Abkhazia was in the midst of an election dispute which was later solved when Sergei Bagapsh 
became president and his contender Vice President in 2005.  In an October 2004 issue of Novoe 
Vremia (Armenia), Bagapsh was interviewed in the lead up to Abkhazian elections:  
"Why do they accuse you of a pro-Georgian orientation?"    
"Pro Russian, they call people, which for all my life I was in Moscow six times.  We all worked 
very long in Moscow, we have children who learn in Moscow, we are all citizens of Russia..."  
(Почему вас обвиняют в прогрузинской ориентации? 
 Прорусским» называют человека, который за всю свою жизнь шесть раз был в Москве. 
Мы все проработали в москве очень долго, у нас дети учаться в москве, мы все граждане 
России...) 128 
This may be seen as representative of the prevailing attitude, at the very least on behalf of the 
Abkhazian leadership, in the sense that Russia is a state with which Abkhazia does not want to 
cut ties.  Additionally, in November of 2010 Bagapsh was very open about the nature of relations 
with Saakashvili, 
  We do not believe any of Saakashvili's words and we are not engaging in dialogue with 
 the fascist regime in Tbilisi.  After Saakashvili's exit Abkhazia will be prepared to lead a 
 dialogue with Georgia, but only as a dialogue between two independent states.  Any other 
 dialogue is not possible.  We all still understand Saakashvili's promise to not attack South 
 Ossetia and Abkhazia in the run up to the barbarous aggression in August of 2008.  That 
 is why we do not believe his words. 
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 (Мы не верим никаким словам Саакашвили и никогда не вступим в диалог с 
 фашистским режимом Тбилиси. Абхазия после ухода Саакашвили готова будет 
 вести диалог с Грузией, но только как диалог между двумя независимыми 
 государствами. Никакого другого диалога быть не может.  Мы все еще помним 
 обещания Саакашвили не нападать на Южную Осетию и Абхазию в преддверии 
 варварской агрессии в августе 2008 года. Поэтому мы не верим его словам.) 129 
 
  At the same time, Saakashvili also sought incentives to entice South Ossetia to rejoin 
Georgia proper.  In 2005, Saakashvili set forth a broad but somewhat opaque plan for South 
Ossetia in which it would be granted increased autonomy regarding the administration of South 
Ossetian politics, while also having membership in Georgian governing structures.  In contrast to 
Abkhazia, the South Ossetians would also be granted reparations from the war in the early 
1990s.  Additionally, this plan included a commitment to more cultural rights that had 
traditionally been suppressed, including the right to use one's native language and more control 
over regional education.130  However, the potentially positive impact of these initiatives was 
impeded by Saakashvili's war on corruption, which effectively stripped one of the few money 
generating prospects of the South Ossetians, by forcing the closure of the Ergneti Market, a black 
market hub in near Tskhinvali.131  This measure also proved counter-productive because it hurt 
Saakashvili by garnering more support for Eduard Kokoity and emboldened South Ossetia's 
strident stance towards Georgia. Saakashvili's actions were perceived by Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as one more in a string of burgeoning Georgian state power, especially in light of Tbilisi 
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reclaiming more control over Ajaria.132  Ultimately, his policies did more to aggravate an already 
tense situation antecedent to the 2008 war.    
Russian-Georgian Relations and the August 2008 War 
In early 2008 Kosovo declared independence, an act that was subsequently condemned by 
Russia, on the basis that the precedent would allow a pretext for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to 
do the same.   
 However, the Russian government did not act on its rhetoric leading up to Kosovar 
independence.133  In fact, initially there was a thaw in Russian-Georgian relations.  About a year 
earlier, Georgia underwent domestic turmoil when Saakashvili's government violently 
suppressed peaceful protests.  This in turn prompted an immediate and unfavorable response 
from Western states and institutions which had hitherto seen the Tbilisi government as a 
progressive and democratic institution.134  In order to re-establish democratic legitimacy, 
Saakashvili held elections and was re-elected in early 2008.  It was after this that relations 
between Tbilisi and Moscow appeared to be thawing, as the former conceded that the latter had a 
part it "...could play in the conflict resolution processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia."135  
However, this springtime of relations was short lived.  In the early days of March, the Georgian 
government decided that the Joint Control Commission, established after the South Ossetian war 
in the early 1990s, was ineffective and consequently removed itself from the JCC negotiation 
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framework.136  In response, the Russian government resumed full trade with Abkhazia for the 
first time since 1996.  It did so with full knowledge that the Georgian government would oppose 
such a move.137  In the following months, an increasing number of Russian troops transferred to 
Abkhazia in order to mend infrastructure such as railroads which Russia believed came under the 
jurisdiction of the JCC mandate in Abkhazia.  However, Russia simultaneously shipped more 
defense materiel to the region.  In addition, the Russian government publicized its decision to 
officially recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  These events fostered fear and protestation 
from Tbilisi and to an extent, the West.138  In June of 2008, Civil Georgia quoted NATO 
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer saying that the presence of Russian troops "...is clearly 
in contravention of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which NATO strongly 
supports.  These forces should be withdrawn, and both Russia and Georgia should engage 
quickly in a high-level and open dialogue to de-escalate tensions.”139  This reprimand was 
preceded by an EU parliament vote in favor of a resolution that called on Russia to remove its 
military force from Abkhazia as well as a reform of the current JCC framework due to Russia's 
clear lack of impartiality.140  Russia continued its mobilization while holding to its justification 
of offering humanitarian aid.  However, sporadic bombing which left several dead in South 
Ossetia further exacerbated tensions and the area of escalation spread from Abkhazia to South 
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Ossetia in a matter of weeks.141  Despite attempts at reconciliation, all of which failed, the 
Georgian government transferred more troops on the afternoon of August 7th.142  As Popjanevski 
notes, additional troops also came from the North Caucasus Military District by way of North 
Ossetia.143  On the morning of August 8th, Russia launched its invasion from its strongholds in 
South Ossetia and bombed as far as the outskirts of Tbilisi.  On August 10th, Georgia officially 
asked for a cease-fire with Russia, which was not only ignored but actually appeared to 
encourage the Russian advance to an even greater extent.  Indeed, Russia overtook Zugdidi, 
Senaki and Gori, the last of which lies about 82 km from Tbilisi.144  Russia attacked Georgia's 
economic infrastructure as well, especially its trade outlets on the Black Sea.  Efforts for conflict 
resolution were gravely eroded when Russia recognized the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in August of 2008.  Immediately following, Russia occupied these regions in the context 
of liberation from an oppressive Georgia, or the pretext of liberation depending on individual 
inclinations.145  David Smith proposes in his chapter 'The Saakashvili Administration's Reaction 
to Russian Policies' that Russia wanted to circumvent the possibility of Georgian membership in 
NATO, in order to protect its geopolitical interests.146  Russia continues to disrupt Georgia's 
intentions to join the Western security paradigm by supporting Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
their aspirations for independence, thus ensuring that the Georgian Republic is an unconsolidated 
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democracy which also harbors extensive security threats and consequently unable to meet NATO 
criteria.   
 The next section will provide analysis on Russian involvement in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia from the wars of the 1990s to the present.  However, it is important to note that just as 
Russia's actions have damaged the stability of the Georgian state, the simultaneous vacillation on 
behalf of supranational institutions, to the extent of integration into the Western security 
paradigm that it is willing to allow Georgia, ultimately benefits Moscow.  German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel noted in April of 2008 and again in 2014 before the NATO Summit in Wales that 
while Georgia has made recognizable progress, it is still not ready for a Membership Action Plan 
to be implemented.147  In such a seemingly intractable situation, a MAP arguably could provide a 
stabilizing force.  In other words, it would be advantageous for Georgian security but not NATO.  
Indeed the mandate for the OSCE Mission in Tbilisi which had been in place since 1992 was not 
renewed.148  Additionally, the next section will outline the role of supranational institutions and 
the Unites States in Georgian affairs.  It will argue, as the literature does, the geostrategic 
importance of Georgia in the balance of power between Russia and the United States, in 
particular. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT: THE ROLE OF RUSSIA, THE U.S. AND 
SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 Russian forces were involved to a limited extent in the wars of the early 1990s and 
constituted part of the peacekeeping forces in the conflict zones after the ceasefire agreements 
and so remained at the time of the 2008 war.  Russia's involvement in this war and its recognition 
of an independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia firmly pitted it against Georgia and the 
International Community.  Further, what Georgia perceives as a resurgence of Russian 
hegemony and thus its interest in re-appropriating its "near abroad" will only continue to provoke 
Tbilisi.149  The Abkhazians and South Ossetians viewed the invading Russian forces as liberators 
from Saakahsvili's Georgia, which remained intent to retain both regions as part of a sovereign 
Georgia.  Indeed, NPR reported from South Ossetia that President Eduard Kokoity of South Ossetia 
declared shortly after the Russian occupation that  
 
 Russia had saved the South Ossetians from genocide during Georgia's attempt to retake 
 its breakaway province earlier this month. He called Georgia's government a bloodthirsty 
 fascist  regime, and blamed its ally, the United States, for taking part in the Georgian 
 attack. Then he said he'd appeal to Moscow to recognize South Ossetia's independence.150 
 
 
However, Russian forces pushed further into Georgia proper to the town of Gori which lies 
roughly 81km from Tbilisi.  The five day war ended under ceasefires arbitrated by the European 
Union and signed the 12th of August and 8th of September.151  It resulted in 850 deaths and 
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thousands of wounded as well as forcing thousands to flee their homes, the majority from South 
Ossetia.152  A significant aspect of the contention over Russia's actions in August of 2008 is 
whether or not the actions can be taken at face value or whether there are ulterior motives.  
Notably, the South Caucasus are of importance to both the U.S. and Russia because the fate of 
this region will shift the balance of power in the region.  For this reason, Russia's intervention on 
behalf of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians also maintains the current state of affairs, as a 
divided and tumultuous Georgian state prevents it from being fully accepted by Western 
institutions, thus keeping Georgia in limbo.  Additionally, as Bruno Coppieters concludes there is 
no single defined and unified bloc conducting and setting up negotiation frameworks for 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Thus Russia's support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the one 
hand, and U.N. support for Georgia's position on the other prolongs and may perhaps worsen 
these partially frozen conflicts.153  As Coppieters notes, "The main conclusion that can be drawn 
from this overview of failed UN mediation activities is that the UN and Russia are competing for 
a leading mediating role in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict."154   
 Notably, there is a more recent precedent for Abkhazian and South Ossetian reliance on 
Russia.  Throughout the 1990s both regions needed Russia to maintain a modicum of economic 
and political well being, in addition to providing security guarantees.  Indeed, the ruble has been 
widely used and is an accepted form of currency in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The 
International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia found that Georgia initiated the 
2008 attack on South Ossetia and that the South Ossetian response was legal within the bounds 
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of international law.155  At the same time, it was also noted that South Ossetian actions, 
excepting defense, against Georgian civilians were illegal under International Human Rights 
Law.156   Moreover, the report concluded that while Georgia initiated the conflict, Russia 
countered with an unnecessary degree of force which ultimately infringed international law.157  
In the wake of the 2008 war the European Union established a Monitoring Mission to Georgia in 
order to: 
 
 to ensure that there is no return to hostilities;  
 to facilitate the resumption of a safe and normal life for the local communities living on 
both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL) with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia;  
 to build confidence among the conflict parties;  
 to inform EU policy in Georgia and the wider region.158  
  
The EUMM is authorized to operate throughout the entire Georgian territory.  The West 
understands this to mean Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, both states have refused the 
EUMM.  In December of 2014, the mandate was continued for two more years with a €18.3 
million budget.159   
 Currently the governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are recognized and guaranteed 
by Russia.  The structure of the Abkhazian government, concomitant to its 1994 constitution, is a 
representative democracy.  It asserts its right to exist as a sovereign state unequivocally stating " 
[t]he bearer of sovereignty and the only source of authority in the Republic of Abkhazia shall be 
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its people - the citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia."160  It retains the right to enter into 
interstate agreements and international treaties and ownership of its natural resources.161  
Additionally, Abkhaz is the official state language, with Russian recognized as an official 
second.  It was declared independent in 1999 and Russia has since eased conditions under which 
Abkhazians can acquire Russian passports, as a result many Abkhazians hold dual Russian 
citizenship.162 Abkhazia is of geostrategic value whereas South Ossetia, other than the Russian 
Military Highway leading into Georgia proper, is desolate by comparison.  Among Abkhazia's 
resources are coal, timber, and hydroelectric power.163  Abkhazia also offers another outlet to the 
Black Sea and with it, possibly more valuable commodities.  It entered an agreement with 
Russia's Rosneft in 2009 allowing the latter to explore for natural gas and oil.164  However, it is 
notable that a shadow economy, levels of corruption, and nepotism remain prevalent.165  
Together, with South Ossetia the two exist in a liminal space and despite the promulgation of 
state constitutions, the joint fate is undecided.  The following two sections will discuss the 
current institutional mechanisms in both the Republic of Georgia and the Autonomous Republic 
of Ajaria as well as the mechanisms sustaining de-facto governance in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.         
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CHAPTER 7 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL MECHANISMS IN THE GEORGIAN REPUBLIC 
AND THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF AJARIA 
 
 It is necessary to define the political mechanisms operative in Georgia and the 
Autonomous Republic of Ajaria.  The political mechanisms are the institutions which work in 
tandem in order to provide effective and efficient function of the state.  Like many other post-
Soviet states, Georgia had to establish its political trajectory following its independence in 1991.  
There were extant institutional mechanisms in place at the time of independence that carried over 
from the Soviet period as well as a model for a constitution which harkened back to its 
independence in 1921.  A brief overview regarding the nature of Georgian politics is essential to 
understanding its current political trajectory.  Additionally, a deeper knowledge of Georgian 
politics helps to dismantle a common binary that perceives Russia as an aggressor and Georgia 
as a victim in the battle for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  By providing insight into how 
Georgian politics developed post 1991 and how policies were either deleterious or apathetic to 
the needs of the separatist regions, it will allow for a deeper understanding of how Georgian 
politics currently affect the state's interactions with the separatist regions. 
 The chaotic and at times corrupt development of Georgian politics is a reasonable 
expectation for a government previously entrenched in the Soviet system.  After the removal of 
Gamsakhurdia from power, Shevardnadze returned and an election was held.  However, not all 
regions, such as Abkhazia voted and furthermore the election was nominal because Eduard 
Shevardnadze had no competition.166  At a time when Tbilisi was ardent to maintain control over 
Abkhazia, it excluded an Abkhaz voice in Georgian politics.  Later, Shevardnadze devised a 
coalition in the Citizens Union of Georgia which consisted of academics, communists, 
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nomenklatura (whom Shevardnadze needed in order to sustain his position as head of state) and 
also the Green Party.  Along with a degree of political plurality there was also an opposition 
party called the National Democratic Party led by Gia Chanturia, whose stature provided a voice 
to a weak opposition until he was murdered in 1994.167  The Georgian government was still not 
in a position to command attention from the separatist regions, especially with its government in 
such a precarious state.  At the same time it is only fair to note that Georgia was on its way to 
developing a democratic system after two wars and three years post-independence.  In 1995, 
Georgia's parliament was holding discussions on the best way to formulate a new constitution.  
Much of the arguments concerned what type of governing system Georgia should adopt.  The 
contention was mainly between a presidential or parliamentary governing institution.  One of the 
key problems with the negotiations was the lack of consideration on behalf of the politicians for 
their constituents' wants and needs combined with a zeal to ensure that the political system they 
adopted would provide them the most power.168  Ultimately a parliamentary system was adopted 
which had enough power to make substantive decisions.  It was directly representative of the 
people and could not be disbanded by the president or have its mandate revoked before the next 
appointed elections.  The parliament was granted the power of the purse as well as the power to 
approve ministers.169  As Areshidze notes, the Georgian government under the new constitution 
did not meet the expectations of a democratic government, however it was sturdy enough to 
provide some check on the executive branch as well as granting significant, albeit few powers, to 
the legislative and judiciary.170  In 1995, Shevardnadze was elected president and the party he 
created, Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG) won a fair number of seats in parliament.  At the time 
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of the 1995 elections, an Ajarian party, Revival was aligned with Shevardnadze and the CUG.  In 
actuality the primary goal of Revival was to protect Aslan Abashidze's rule in Ajaria.  Though 
Abashidze was not making claims for independence, he maintained virtual control over Ajaria 
and used his close relationship with Shevardnadze to this end.171  In 1995, Zurab Zhvania 
became speaker in parliament.  In the following years Zhvania positioned himself closely with 
Shevardnadze and used his influence to channel foreign aid to organizations of which he 
approved such as the UN Association of Georgia, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy, and 
Development and the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association among others.172  Conversely, this 
meant that organizations of which Zhvania did not approve, did not receive external funds.  
Zhvania eventually amassed enough to power and influence to the extent that he was able to 
manipulate Shevardnadze into fulfilling his aspirations and the President came under the control 
of Zhvania.  During this time corruption became evermore commonplace almost out of necessity 
as it was incredibly difficult to be successful in private business ventures due to obstructions 
created by the government.  Indeed, Georgia implemented a VAT which became so cost 
prohibitive for many businesses that they simply did not implement it.173  Notably however, the 
economy was growing at a fair pace by the late 1990s, not least due to its acceptance of massive 
amounts of foreign aid.  Both the legislative and possibly also the presidential elections (which 
returned the incumbent Shevardnadze to the post) were manipulated.174  By the turn of the 
millennium, the Georgian business elite consisted of individuals who built their businesses from 
the ground up.  The government enacted policies in the 1990s that were antagonistic to a liberal 
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market, and thus business.175  However, this business class still became prominent contenders on 
the political scene in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Members of this class were appointed to 
chair institutions that would advance free market reforms.176  They soon ran into opposition in 
the parliament from the CUG.  The man leading representation of the CUG at that time was 
Mikheil Saakashvili.  
Mikheil Saakashvili: His Rise and Fall in Georgian Politics 
 Zhvania and Saakashvili were still backing Shevardnadze and the CUG. Part of this support 
manifested itself in attacking the business elite who were pressing the issue of market reform.  
As Areshidze notes, "Zhvania's team called the businessmen traitors and declared that they were 
endangering Georgia's stability and democracy, which they claimed only Shevardnadze and the 
CUG could provide."177  Meanwhile, Zhvania engineered the fraud that took place in the 1999 
and 2000 elections.178  By the summer of 2001 Saakashvili was prepared to part ways with 
Shevardnadze, the man who helped build Saakashvili's political career.  He wanted to appear to 
the public as taking a firm stance against corruption.  Though this was mostly for appearances as 
Saakashvili, by virtue of being politically tied to Shevardnadze during his career rise, was 
implicit in the very corruption he was condemning.179  Saakashvili's next move was to create his 
own party, the United National Movement, a party that later allied itself with others and became 
Saakashvili's party when he won the presidential election in 2004 and again in 2008.180  It has 
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been well documented that Saakashvili was very deft at public relations, both domestically and 
in his courtship of western institutions and states, the U.S. especially.  Domestically, Saakashvili 
relied on a combination of nationalism and populism in order to win and maintain popular 
support, a tactic employed by Gamsakhurdia from the very outset.  Abroad, the president touted 
the liberal reforms advanced by his camp and the further creation of democratic institutions.181  
As De Waal notes, though Saakashvili's government made great strides in curbing corruption, it 
did so in a manner that was less democratic than his rhetoric would have the West believe.182  As 
late as 2012, in a meeting with President Obama at the White House, Obama affirmed the 
progress that Georgia made regarding "institution building", "rule of law" and the forthcoming 
"free and fair elections."183  The irony lies in that Saakashvili himself would soon be due to stand 
trial for numerous charges including misuse of funds, impeding the rule of law and engaging in 
extralegal measures to thwart opposition.184  In December of 2014, Giorgi Badashvili made clear 
his intentions to appeal to Interpol to place Saakashvili on its wanted list.185  
Margvelashvili's appeals to Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
During Saakashvili's time as president he managed to amend the constitution by shifting more 
power to the Prime Minister from the position of president.186  These changes took effect when 
Giorgi Margvelashvili acceded to the presidency in November of 2013 after being elected in 
October.  Margvelashvili belongs to Georgian Dream, Prime Minister Ivanishvili's political party 
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that surpassed Saakashvili's United National Movement in the 2012 parliamentary contest.187  
There are several points worth quoting directly from Margvelashvili's State of the Nation 
Address in February of 2014 regarding both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as direct appeal 
to Russia. 
I would like to address our Abkhazian and Ossetian compatriots with the words I 
pronounced presenting my pre-election program:  We offer you to live in the 
European, free, developed, democratic and peaceful state, which will be the 
guarantee of well-being, protection of ethnic, religious and cultural identity of its 
each citizen and the immunity of their political rights.  I also want to address the 
leaders of the de-facto regimes on our occupied territories: do not act against the 
vital interests of your people and do not try to create new obstacles between the 
peoples, who are linked with common statehood for many centuries.  Our unity 
was violated due to many mistakes and by rough interference of other parties that 
costed [sic] for us the blood of our peoples. The identity and self-cognition of 
Abkhazian and Ossetian people is in jeopardy today. The strongest warrant for the 
protection of these principles is in our unity and co-habitation. Therefore, if the 
future of Abkhazians, Ossetians and all the peoples living on these territories is 
the least precious for you, don’t leave them in isolation!188 
 
Margvelashvili makes clear in this excerpt that the Georgian political elite are approaching the 
political situation in the de-facto states with condescension and misunderstanding.  This is 
illustrated by his appeal to the leaders of these regions in asserting that they misunderstand the 
will of people.  Georgia has unequivocally chosen a European orientation but in the process is 
overlooking the inconvenient truth that Abkhazia and South Ossetia may not want the same.  In 
Margvelashvili's March 2015 address to the Georgian parliament he stated, "Now, when the 
world is situated in the process of a search for a new order, not only do we need Europe, but 
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Europe and the west need a developed, democratic Georgia."  (Теперь, когда мир находится в 
процессе поиска нового порядка, не только нам нужна Европы, но и Европе и западу 
нужна развитая, демократическая Грузия.)189 
Indeed, as will be discussed later in this section, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have both 
entered into agreements that deepens Russian involvement, not limit it.  Continuing on, President 
Margvelashvili also addressed Russia saying that Georgia intends to become a liberal democratic 
state that will determine its own course and that 
This is understood by our neighbors, this is understood by the progressive part of 
the mankind. Alongside with our partners we try our best to convince Russian 
Federation leadership in this.  We try to show them that by creating obstacles to 
Georgia none of the problems of Russia will be solved. And even may be, on the 
contrary…  We try to show them that secure, economically strong, stable Georgia, 
which has made its European and Euro-Atlantic choice, does not mean an 
Alliance against any other country.  We are building a peaceful and democratic 
country that aims kind neighborly relations based only on the protection of our 
sovereignty and territorial integrity – only by respect to these values.  With such 
rational approach, we have changed the aggressive rhetoric of the previous 
government that had not brought to any positive effect.190 
 
In November of 2014, Russia signed a treaty with Abkhazia which stipulated  "...closer bilateral 
cooperation in the social, economic, humanitarian, foreign policy, defence and security areas, 
while preserving Abkhazia’s state sovereignty."191  Russia officially recognized the 
independence of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the aftermath of the August 2008 war and 
has since pursued to build and strengthen relations with both de-facto governments.  In February 
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of 2015 Russia entered into an agreement with South Ossetia.  The second clause of the first 
article of the agreement states the following:  
      
 2. The Russian Federation will in every possible way assist in the development of 
 international relations with the Republic of South Ossetia, including widening the circle 
 of  official recognition of its state, and creating conditions for entry of South Ossetia in 
international organizations and associations, including in creating on initiative and (or) 
by the assistance of the Russian Federation.  
 
2. Российская Федерация будет всемерно способствовать развитию 
 международных связей Республики Южная  Осетия,  включая  расширение 
 круга официально признавших ее государств, и созданию  условий  для 
 вступления Республики Южная Осетия в  международные  организации  и 
 объединения, в том числе в созданные  по  инициативе  и  (или)  при 
 содействии Российской Федерации.192 
 
Georgia responded by unequivocally condemning both moves.  Indeed, Russia's agreement with 
Abkhazia compelled Georgians to protest on the streets of Tbilisi.193  It also prompted 
Saakashvili to criticize the current government by not taking a more aggressive stance against 
Russia.194  The Georgian government reoriented its trajectory in how it will approach Russia.  
Indeed, as is evident from Margvelashvili's address, the government has mollified its tone 
compared to the government led by the United National Movement and Saakashvili.  The 
Political mechanisms structuring the Georgian government have shifted immensely since the 
Rose Revolution and as recently as 2013.  Previous to 2013 the power to construct a government 
was manifested solely in the Presidency and was not required to be subject to review by the 
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Parliament.195  The development of political mechanisms in Ajaria paralleled those in Tbilisi to 
some extent especially because Abashidze relied on Shevardnadze's backing for his political 
survival.  Ajaria, did not begin to have developed democratic structures until Abashidze was 
ousted in 2004 and relations between Tbilisi and Batumi were overhauled.  The next section will 
primarily focus on the structure of the Ajarian government and its current operation in relation to 
the Georgian government.  
Political Mechanisms in Ajaria 
As mentioned above, Ajaria was controlled by Aslan Abashidze from 1991 until 2004 when the 
political regime in Tbilisi changed.  His political ties to Shevardnadze enabled Abashidze to 
maintain power and a great degree of autonomy in political, economic and social policy.  The 
regional conflict in Ajaria in 2004 resulted from Saakashvili's successful attempt to depose 
Abashidze and his corrupt regime and in turn establish Tbilisi's control.  The mechanisms for 
governance in Ajaria changed drastically post Abashidze.  In July of 2004, the 'Law of the 
Autonomous Republic of Ajara On Structure, Authorities, And Rules for Activities of 
Government of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara' was established.  This reestablished national 
control by granting the president of Georgia the power of approval regarding members of the 
Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara within in ten days of its formation.196  
Additionally the law makes clear that "... [t]he Government shall be in the composition of the 
executive power system of Georgia."197  Ajaria is currently governed by the Supreme Council 
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which is elected every four years as well as having both an executive and judicial branch, as well 
as being vested with the authority to devise its budget.198  The system is federalized to the degree 
that it maintains local governing institutions responsible to the government in Batumi, its seat of 
government.  In turn, Batumi is ultimately responsible to and governed by Tbilisi.  The current 
Chairman of Government is Archil Khabadze whose work experience largely consists of bank 
administration.  The government's ministries are Education, Culture and Sport, Labour, Health 
and Social Care as well as Agriculture and Finance and Economy.  The administrative 
composition of Ajaria is worth noting in comparison to that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
regarding the current state of affairs in those regions.  As will be discussed in the next section, 
the structures which exist in Ajaria are absent, to varying degrees, in the de-facto separatist 
regions.  Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have de-facto governing institutions but they are 
inhibited by resources, particularly in South Ossetia's case, and are institutionally anemic.        
Mechanisms Sustaining De-facto Governance: An Analysis of Abkhazia and South Ossetia  
There were institutions in place in Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the time of Georgia's 
independence from the Soviet Union.  However weak these institutions were in comparison to 
those in Tbilisi, the governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali had a modicum of experience with 
government.  Due to the wars in the 1990s, these institutions had little space to develop.  Indeed, 
the struggle with Tbilisi over the degree of autonomy these regions would have combined with 
chauvinistic rhetoric emanating from Tbilisi eventually pushed Abkhazia and South Ossetia to 
officially declare independence in 1999 and 2008, respectively.  As is well known, both de-facto 
governments were recognized by Moscow in addition to few smaller nations, but there was, and 
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is no broad recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence.  Despite this fragile 
political position, institutions in the de-facto republics are supported by Russia.  The institutions 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia vary greatly, as do the resources each possesses for supporting 
the maintenance of their governments.  The economy of Abkhazia is significantly more advanced 
than that of South Ossetia.  In large part, this is due to the natural resources Abkhazia has at its 
discretion and its coast on the Black Sea.  South Ossetia is landlocked and its agrarian economy 
largely relies on the informal market, a significant portion of which disappeared when 
Saakashvili's government closed the Ergneti market near Tskhinvali. Since the death of President 
Sergei Bagapsh in 2011, the Abkhazian government has experienced some disarray.  At present, 
the current government in Sukhumi consists of a president, prime minister and parliament as well 
as a cabinet.  The position of prime minister is selected by the president.  However, after this 
appointment there is little accountability.199  Indeed, one of the objectives of the recently elected 
President, Raul Khajimba, is to amend the constitution in order to create a mechanism for 
accountability within the government.  Khajimba won the election by a very small margin and 
has faced criticisms from the opposition that his talk of democracy is merely rhetoric as he is 
dismissive of the opposition.200  Indeed, he led a coup against the former president, Aleksandr 
Ankvab for the very same reasons.  Khajimba noted his primary objectives in his first speech as 
President, noting that unifying the nation, building the state and engaging in reform as well as 
engaging in new agreements with Russia regarding the relationship between governments.201  At 
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the end of November 2014, Khajimba and President Putin signed an agreement "On Union 
Relations And Strategic Partnership" which outlined measures for further integration.   
However, the deal did not go without debate in Abkhaz parliament and indeed the language of 
this document was edited after calls for changes by the Abkhaz government, including President 
Khajimba.202  This is noteworthy because Abkhazia perceives its position of one that has some 
power to negotiate.  In stark contrast, it is very clear that the government in South Ossetia does 
not carry the same negotiating power with Russia.  This was illustrated at the end of 2013 in a 
visit by Vladislav Surkov who told the government that South Ossetia would not be able to join 
the CIS Customs Union until it "laying phone lines and asphalting the streets."203  This in large 
part due to the fact that Tskhinvali failed to use Russian aid to rebuild infrastructure that was 
destroyed or maimed in the August 2008 war.  Not only did Eduard Kokoity's government fail to 
use it, but it embezzled the majority of funds.  It was for this reason, in addition to the poor state 
of the economy that the President of South Ossetia, Leonid Tibilov, disbanded the government at 
the beginning of 2014.204  The rebuilding of infrastructure is one of the primary objectives and 
obstacles with which the government is reconciling.  Part of the problem lies with certain 
ministers who either will not work together or are placing more emphasis on establishing their 
political parties.205  It follows from this that those in the public who have remained in South 
Ossetia have become resigned to the poor state of their government.     
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CONCLUSION 
 One of the main objectives of this project was to identify reasons explaining why 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia separated from Georgia but not Ajaria, especially given that Ajaria 
endured the longest foreign occupation among the three regions.  It is at this juncture that 
questions and perceptions of ethnic identity are most prevalent.  Unlike Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia, Ajarians perceive the Georgian state not as a separate entity but one of which they are a 
part.  The Abkhaz and South Ossetian governments continue to seek a sovereign identity 
recognized by the international community.  Currently, Russia is the only powerful guarantor 
backing claims of sovereignty, despite maintaining geo-strategic interests for doing so.  
Importantly, the governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not in a position to fight for 
sovereignty.  Though Abkhazia has more resources than South Ossetia, both do not have the 
military base to fight for independence and so must rely on Russia.  The current geo-strategic 
political situation dictates that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia seek sovereign states recognized 
by the international community, but cannot do so and are thus caught betwixt political powers.  
Toft's theory regarding the indivisibility of territory is helpful in explaining the current condition 
of the Georgian state.  The land is integral to the realization of objectives pursued both by 
Georgia and, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Compared to the state, ethnic groups often perceive 
territory as an inherent part of their identity, whereas states understand land in terms of territorial 
integrity and having a politically consolidated state.  Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the 
Georgian state are all reliant on the same territory for which they are fighting to realize their 
objectives.  The longevity of Georgia as a political unit is directly dependent on the maintenance 
of its territorial integrity, just as the fate of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence rests in 
their ability to maintain control of their current land claims. 
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 Thus the stateness problem continues to plague Georgia.  The Russian response to 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia has only further served to complicate conflicts which are easily 
rekindled.  Additionally, the roles of the European Union, Council of Europe, OSCE and the 
United Nations have largely been peacekeeping and democracy building.  In June of 2014, 
Georgia signed an Association Agreement with the EU.  This firmly signaled to Moscow that 
Tbilisi was orienting westward, at least under the current administration.  Still, Georgia's 
territorial integrity is very ambiguous, but it is clear that to the extent Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia have Russia's guarantee, complete democratic consolidation of Georgia will be evasive.  
The question is whether Russia is truly acting as a champion for the rights of Abkhazians and 
South Ossetians or if its ulterior motive is to prevent Georgia from becoming a consolidated 
democracy aligned with the West.  Yet, Russia's motives may comprise both scenarios.  It is true 
that a stable Georgia would potentially be very strategic for the U.S. and other western 
operations in which they are involved.  In fact, the U.S. military held training exercises in 2008, 
shortly before but unrelated to the August 2008 War.  Moreover, events in the region should not 
be analyzed in isolation from world events.  It is clear by Russia's actions in Crimea that it is 
exacerbating conflict in order to manipulate potential outcomes to its advantage.  In many ways, 
Russia still conceptualizes its security as a zero-sum game.  If states, like Ukraine and Georgia 
orient and indeed become fully fledged members of a European and U.S. driven security 
paradigm, it is perceived as a loss and thus a threat to Russian security.  This is perhaps in part an 
explanation for Russia's instigation in its near abroad.   
 However, it is equally as useful to strip away the international dimension in analysis of 
the two separatist regions in order to understand the behavior of the Georgian government 
towards Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Ajaria since its independence in 1991.   Rather 
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significantly the negative character of Georgian policy towards it minorities provided much of 
the impetus for Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence.  This negativity was partly due to 
the populist nature of domestic politics which often contained nationalist appeals and threatened 
all of Georgia's minorities.  Gamsakhurdia's reactive policies and rhetoric further alienated and 
disenfranchised Abkhazia, and South Ossetia especially, driving both regions to conclude that 
the best way to protect their rights and identity was through independence.  Though 
Shevardnadze was less divisive than his predecessor, he nevertheless failed to reestablish the 
Georgian borders of 1918-1921.  After Shevardnadze was forced to leave office following the 
Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili employed the same populist rhetoric of Gamsakhurdia. 
This signaled to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia that Georgia would not allow independence.  
 The theory of reputation building, as put forth by Barbara Walter can explain this 
unwillingness to allow independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  As previously mentioned 
there are additional ethnicities with neighboring states that could potentially make claims for 
independence if they perceived Abkhazia and South Ossetia successful in doing so, namely 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Moreover, despite that Ajaria is considered ethnically Georgian, 
success of independence movements could make Ajaria less inhibited in the future to separate 
were it to find its economic and political relationship with Tbilisi cumbersome, as Abashidze did 
from 1991 to 2004.  Thus, it is advantageous for the Georgian state to engage in reputation 
building by remaining firm in its refusal of independence for any region and maintaining the 
ability to support that position, politically and militarily.  This is one of the key reasons why 
financial assistance from the U.S. and EU has consistently been a priority of Tbilisi, since 
Saakashvili's government and beyond.   
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 The Georgian state is substantially less fragile than it was throughout the 1990s, not least 
because of its partnership with Western institutions which has garnered financial and political 
support, and also placed Georgia's separatist regions on the West's radar, especially after the 
2008 war.  The international dimension is naturally a composite of powerful interests, which at 
times are in direct conflict with one another.  One of Russia's priorities following the end of the 
Soviet Union was to maintain some influence over its near abroad with the newly independent 
republics.  The Commonwealth of Independent States provided an ideal forum by which this 
objective could be realized.  Indeed, Georgia joined in 1993.  Though Russian policy towards 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia was for much the 1990s aligned with Georgia, it quickly reoriented 
as it perceived the further encroachment of the west on its near abroad.  Especially after 
Shevardnadze left office, Moscow no longer had a Georgian head of state whom it could trust 
would be conservative.  Thus, much of Russian policy can be seen as a reaction to western 
involvement in the South Caucasus, and in Ukraine for that matter.  Finally, Russia's support of 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence encourages instability in Russia and prolongs its 
status as liability; a liability that not all western institutions are keen to fully embrace.   
It is notable that western involvement in the region seeks to stabilize the balance of power and 
increases its regional influence via financial assistance and political agreements with Georgia.  
Russia employs these same methods to promote its influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
It is notable that no strict binary exists in which Russia is the clear aggressor and the U.S. acts as 
a purely positive influence.  Though Russia's role is antagonistic in some ways and its motives 
for supporting Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence are not entirely benevolent, it acts 
from self interest, as do all states and institutions.  The aspirations of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia are exploited by Russia and disregarded by the West because those respective policies 
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prove to be the most advantageous.  The antagonism between Russia and the West has only 
facilitated the economic and political stagnancy in the separatist regions while adding to the 
frustrations stoking the ongoing potential for violent conflict, ultimately working against 
Georgia's aspirations for territorial integrity and a consolidated democracy.     
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